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According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among
competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which
undermines proper comparison. Interestingly, both underconfident and overconfident individuals are capable of
elevating the cooperation level significantly. While former players stimulate a local coordination of strategies, the
presence of overconfident individuals enhances the spatial reciprocity mechanism. In both cases the propagations
of competing strategies are influenced in a biased way resulting in a cooperation supporting environment. These
effects are strongly related to the nonlinear character of invasion probabilities which is a common and frequently
observed feature of microscopic dynamics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of evolutionary game theory is to con-
sider payoff as fitness, and higher payoff in the game is
translated into reproductive success. Hence, due to natural
selection, more successful strategies reproduce faster while
those strategies which are less successful become extinct [1].
This microscopic dynamic assumes an accurate comparison
of payoff values which help competitors to navigate toward a
better evolutionary outcome.
Interestingly, however, we can observe examples in real
life situations when individuals tend to misinterpret their
own payoff values perpetually hence the estimation of payoff
difference can be easily misleading. Overconfidence, believing
more about themselves than they are in reality, could be
a source of biased belief [2]. But underconfident players,
who believe less about themselves, make decisions based on
incorrect perception, too. Indeed, the possible evolutionary
advantage of overconfidence in resource competition games
has already been revealed by previous works [3,4]. The main
conclusion of these works was that overconfidence could be
beneficial because it encourages individuals to claim resources
they could not otherwise win. Secondly, overconfidence keeps
these competitors from walking away from conflicts they
would probably win.
But what if all players are overconfident or all players are
underconfident when they estimate their own achievement?
One may expect that if all members commit the same error of
perception then there is no relevant change from the viewpoint
of evolutionary dynamics. In this work we focus on this
question by considering the fundamental problem of coopera-
tion [5]. Here cooperator and defector strategies compete and
to defect would always provide a higher individual income
against a cooperator, but mutual cooperation would offer the
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optimal income for the whole community. In the last decades
several cooperator supporting mechanisms were identified [6],
including reward [7–11] or punishment [12–17], population
heterogeneity [18–20], player mobility [21,22], conformity
[23,24], and tolerance [25,26], which could be helpful to avoid
the tragedy of the common state when everyone chooses the
tempting defection [27].
In this work we will not assume any sophisticated envi-
ronmental feedback mechanism [28–30] or demanding cog-
nitive skill about players [31–36], but only explore the plain
consequence of perception error collectively made by group
members. To reveal the interaction between strategies and
individual skills we consider a coevolutionary model [37–41]
where players may not only imitate a more successful strategy
but also adopt the way to consider individual achievement
when making decisions. In particular, besides individuals who
are performing unbiased estimation of their payoff values we
also assume the initial presence of over- and underconfident
players and monitor the coevolutionary process. Interestingly,
being overconfident not only ensures individual advantage but
could also be beneficial for the whole community if everyone
follows the same trait. Furthermore, a higher cooperation level
can also be reached when all members of the population are
underconfident regarding their own success. These observa-
tions can be explained dynamically by a modified microscopic
process which has a biased consequence on strategy propaga-
tions.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We first present
the definition of our model in the next section. We then proceed
with the presentation of our main results and their explanations.
This is followed by our conclusions and a discussion of their
implications in the last section.
II. COEVOLUTION OF PERCEPTION AND PLAYER
STRATEGIES
Starting from the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game we
assume that unconditional cooperator and defector players are
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distributed on a graph. For simplicity we use a square lattice
interaction graph, but we stress that our observations remain
valid for other types of interaction networks.
To capture the essence of a social conflict we adopt the
simplified parametrization of weak prisoner’s dilemma game
[42] where the only parameter is the temptation to defect T ,
while reward for mutual cooperation provides R = 1 payoff.
The punishment P for mutual defection as well as the sucker’s
payoff S of a cooperator facing a defector are equal to 0.
The evolution of the competing strategies is performed
in accordance with the following elementary steps. First, a
randomly selected player x acquires its payoff x by playing
the game with all its kx neighbors. Next, a randomly chosen
neighbor of x, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff y by
playing the game with all its ky neighbors. Last, player x adopts
the sy strategy of player y with a probability
(sy → sx ) = 1/{1 + exp[(x −y )/K]}, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise that quantifies the
uncertainty of strategy adoptions [43,44].
The only difference from the traditional model is we assume
that players may have different levels of self-deception when
they evaluate their own payoff values for pairwise comparison.
For simplicity we establish three classes for self-deception,
which are underconfident (u), normal (n), and overconfident
(o) players. Traditionally, when normal players calculate the
imitation probability they apply an unbiased (or accurate) pay-
off value for their own achievement. An overconfident player
x, however, believes more about her own achievement than
its proper x value. Consequently, she will use an enhanced
′x = x (1 + α) payoff value to calculate the imitation proba-
bility. Here parameter α describes the level of overconfidence.
Similarly, an underconfident player x underestimates his own
achievement and uses a reduced′x = x (1 − α) value when
imitation probability is calculated. For simplicity we use the
same parameter to characterize the degree of biased self-
deception to both directions. Notably, the self-deception level
can also be adopted via a learning step with the same prob-
ability, but the latter option is only considered when players
have different strategies. Otherwise, the overconfident state
would always enjoy an artificial advantage over other states
even within a homogeneous-strategy domain. Nevertheless,
we note that the final cooperation level remains intact if we
allow the adoption of confidence level between players with
identical strategies.
To summarize the microscopic dynamics of our model
a personal strategy and confidence level can be adopted
independently, but using the same adoption probability which
is based on the payoff difference of source and target players.
In other words, it can happen that only a confidence level is
adopted while the strategy of target player remains unchanged,
or only strategy invasion happens, or both features are adopted
simultaneously.
Technically we consider a six-strategy model where be-
sides traditional or normal Cn and Dn players we also have
overconfident Co and Do players and underconfident Cu and
Du competitors. It is important to stress that the increase
(decrease) of payoff for overconfident (underconfident) players
is conceptually different from the general perception error
that is captured via the noise parameter K . While perception
error may emerge toward both directions and an ordinary
player sometimes may overestimate or underestimate payoff
values, but overconfident (underconfident) players tend to use
biased values always into one direction. The key parameters
of our coevolutionary model is the temptation T value which
characterizes the dilemma strength and the α value which
describes how biased the over- and underconfident players are.
Monte Carlo simulations of the game are carried out com-
prising the described coevolutionary steps. Each Monte Carlo
step (MCS) gives a chance for every player to adopt the strategy
and/or self-deception level of a randomly chosen neighbor once
on average. During the evolutionary process we monitor both
strategies and the fractions of different self-deception levels.
When regular interaction graphs were used (such as square
lattice or kagome lattice) the linear size of the system was
between L = 400 and L = 4000. The typical time to reach
a stationary state was 50 000 MCSs, and we averaged the
stationary values over another 10 000 steps. For heterogeneous
graphs, like random or scale-free graphs, we used N = 5000
nodes and generated 1000 independent graphs to average the
obtained values for the requested accuracy. As already noted, in
the following we present the details of results obtained mostly
on a square grid, but conceptually similar results can be reached
for other interaction graphs.
III. RESULTS
Before presenting our results for structured populations
we note that in a well-mixed, unstructured population where
players have random temporary connections the introduction
of biased confidence levels has no particular consequence.
More precisely, defector players always prevail for any T > 1
value in agreement with the classical model [5]. Therefore
a spatially structured population, which is a rather realistic
assumption in several cases, is a fundamental condition for the
results discussed below. As a general observation, overcon-
fident players will always prevail in the whole population if
we wait long enough. This behavior, which agrees with the
prediction obtained for the resource competition game [3],
is not really surprising because these players are reluctant
to adopt the state of other competitors while normal and
especially underconfident players can do it more easily. But our
principal interest is to explore how the presence of players with
biased self-deception may influence the cooperation level. This
point could be specially interesting in the situation when both
cooperators and defectors are overconfident and overestimate
their own achievements simultaneously.
The answer to this question can be found on the right-hand
side of Fig. 1 where we plotted the general cooperation level
on the T -α plane. This surface suggests that by using an
intermediate α value a significantly high cooperation level can
be reached even at a large temptation value where a normal
system would terminate onto a full defector state. Evidently, if
α is too large then players would evaluate their payoff values
too high, which would result in a frozen state (not shown in
Fig. 1). But staying at a moderate α the full collapse of the
cooperator state can be avoided, which means that a certain
level of overconfidence of all members could be useful for the
whole community.
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FIG. 1. Fraction of cooperators onT -α plane for a square lattice at
K = 0.1 in the case when only underconfident players are present (left
side, red lines) and in the case when only overconfident individuals
are present in the population (right side, blue lines). The latter is also
the evolutionary outcome of the general model when players with
different confidence levels compete for space. The cooperation level
for the normal system is marked by a thick black line at α = 0.
Interestingly, not only overconfident but also underconfi-
dent players can be useful for the whole community. If we
assume a uniform population where all players are under-
confident and underestimate their own payoff values then the
cooperation level can also be elevated comparing to the normal
system where every player estimates payoff values accurately.
This observation is summarized on the left-hand side of Fig. 1
where we again plotted cooperation level on the T -α plane,
which is the fraction of Cu players in this case. As for the
overconfident case, here there is again an optimal intermediate
α value which provides the highest cooperation level.
In Fig. 2 we compare the results of uniform populations
obtained at a fixed α value. These plots highlight that the
positive consequence of biased self-deception is more visible
at high temptation values which would normally ensure a
clear advantage for defector players. Furthermore, an over-
confident population can do even better than an underconfident
population.
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FIG. 2. Comparison of cooperation levels for uniform models
when players with a single-type confidence level are present in
dependence on temptation value at α = 0.2. In all cases players are
staged on a square lattice (L = 400) at K = 0.1.
To collect deeper insights into the typical microscopic
mechanisms responsible for the coevolutionary process, we
present characteristic snapshots of evolution started from a
prepared initial state where all available states are present.
The whole evolution can be monitored in the animation we
provided [45] but the milestones of pattern formations are
described in the following. Figure. 3(a) shows the starting
state where players with different self-deception levels are
distributed separately. In particular, underconfident cooperator
and defector players are arranged randomly in the left third
of the space. Overconfident players are initially distributed
on the right third, while normal players with unbiased self-
deception are in the center third. When evolution is launched
then subsolutions emerge locally. More precisely, as shown in
Fig. 3(b), the applied large temptation value prevents normal
Cn cooperators to survive in the sea of normal Dn defectors.
In biased populations, however, cooperators survive. As the
area marked by I illustrates, Cu players coexist with Du
defectors, and similarly Co cooperators form a solution with
Do defectors in the region marked by II . There is a visible
difference between these two solutions, which will have a
greater importance as discussed below. In particular,Co players
form compact domains in the sea of Do players while the
domains of Cu players are more irregular.
Due to periodic boundary conditions, overconfident players
can interact directly with underconfident players, shown by
area III , and the former solution prevails against the latter.
The stability of Cu + Du solutions is also jeopardized by
normal players because Dn invades the territory of Cu, as
shown by IV in Fig. 3(b). Because of the applied microscopic
dynamic, which allows the adoption of self-deception levels
only between players with different strategies, Dn and Du
states would coexist, as illustrated by I in Fig. 3(c). This
mixture, however, is not stable because some Cu players adopt
the self-deception level from Dn neighbor and the emerging
Cn state can easily spread in a Du domain and sweep them
out completely. This process is shown by II in Fig. 3(c). The
triumph of Cn, however, is just temporary because neighboring
Dn players beat them, as explained previously. Summing up,
albeit Dn and Du are neutral, but the former beats the latter
indirectly with the help of Cn players, who directly invade
Du and after become the prey of Dn. This pattern formation
resembles “the Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go”
effect that emerges in several multistate ecological systems
[46,47].
As we already noted at the beginning of this section,
overconfident players invade the whole population. This inva-
sion can be seen clearly in Fig. 3(d) where we marked both
propagation fronts of this domain. The front marked by I
denotes the irregular, but fast-propagating overconfident →
underconfident transition. Here both Co → Du and Do → Cu
elementary steps assist the propagation. The front marked
by II separating normal and overconfident players is more
regular, but propagates much slower. Here only Co players
can invade Dn territory first which is followed by the some
invasion between Do and Co players, which establishes the
stable coexistence of the latter states. Finally, not shown in
Fig. 3, only these two types of player remain alive.
To understand why biased populations support cooperation,
it is instructive to analyze the propagation processes within
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FIG. 3. Competition of possible solutions at T = 1.1 and α = 0.2
on a square lattice with L = 450 linear size. Different shades of blue
and red colors denote cooperator and defector players with different
self-deception levels as indicated by the legend on the top. Further
details are given in the main text. Snapshots were taken at 0, 200,
600, and 850 MCSs.
uniform systems where players share the same self-deception
level. For this purpose we compare the strategy invasions
in three different uniform systems by using the same T , α
parameter values when evolution is launched from a random
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FIG. 4. Changes of invasion speeds detected via the development
of strategy concentrations when uniform systems are launched from a
random initial state on a L = 4000 square lattice at α = 0.2. (a)ρC
(under) and ρD (under) show how the fractions of cooperators and
defectors change during elementary invasion steps when we replace
normal players by underconfident individuals. Similarly, ρC (over)
andρD (over) denote how the fraction of cooperators and defectors
vary when we replace normal players by overconfident competitors.
Symbols connected by lines mark the leading mechanisms for both
cases which are responsible for the cooperation supporting effects
summarized in Fig. 1. (b) The resulting relative changes of strategies
for all uniform models. This comparison suggests that the advantage
of defector strategy weakens significantly for both underconfident and
overconfident populations.
initial state. As expected, a random mixture of strategies always
supports defector invasion better in the early stage, but its
intensity could be different for populations with different self-
deception levels. The simplest way to quantify the intensity of
invasion is to measure how the fractions of strategies change in
time due to elementary invasion steps. For proper comparison
we measure how the success of specific invasion steps change
when we change the self-deception level for all players.
Considering a normal, unbiased system as a reference, Fig. 4(a)
shows the change for all invasions when we apply biased
populations. Here ρC shows how the successful invasion
steps increasing the cooperation level change if we replace
an unbiased system by a biased model. SimilarlyρD denotes
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FIG. 5. Optimal cooperation levels for square lattice at T = 1.1
by using different K values, as indicated. On the x axis, α′ = α/K is
a normalized parameter for proper comparison. The inset shows the
related invasion probability functions dependent on payoff differences
for the specific K values. This function converges to a linear function
as we increase K .
how the frequency of successful defector invasion steps varies
when we change a normal system to a biased one. As expected,
the strategy invasions are more intensive for an underconfident
population, hence the changes of successful invasion steps are
positive for both strategies. But the increment for cooperator
strategy is larger than for defector strategy. It simply means
that the cooperator invasion in a normal system is so weak
that the general increment of adoption skill for underconfident
players provides a significant support for C strategy. On the
other hand, the invasion success of defection is so strong in a
normal system that it does not give relevant additional support
for D strategy when we use underconfident players who adopt
neighboring strategies more easily.
Also in agreement with our expectation the general strategy
invasion is reduced for the overconfident population, hence
the change is negative compared to the normal system. But
again, the levels of change for different strategies are strikingly
different. While the cooperator invasion decreases just slightly,
the decline of defector invasion is significant when we replace
a normal system by an overconfident population. In other
words, defectors lose more when we lower the general adoption
capacity because their success in a normal system is significant
while cooperator players are rather unsuccessful.
While Fig. 4(a) shows the change of successful strategy in-
vasions compared to a normal system, Fig. 4(b) shows the sum
of defector and cooperator invasions for all uniform systems.
As expected, defectors are more successful for all T values in
all cases, but the success of defectors is significantly weakened
for both biased systems compared to the normal system, which
is also plotted here. Albeit the evolutionary consequences are
similar, but their explanations are different. When undercon-
fident players are used, their general willingness to change
strategy moves the evolutionary dynamics toward a more
neutral direction, hence the individual advantage of defection is
less straightforward. Consequently, the microscopic dynamics
that are less deterministic can be detected from the irregular,
noisy patterns of domains we already noted in Fig. 3(b). In
the presence of overconfident players all microscopic changes
are suppressed in general, but cooperators can benefit more
from this fact. Indeed, network reciprocity is strengthened
and the phalanx of C becomes more robust which is hardly
broken by defectors even for a significantly higher temptation.
Therefore the borders of cooperator domains become smooth,
and the C domains are more compact, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
This observation fits nicely into the general expectation that a
microscopic rule which strengthens surface tension and smooth
separating domain walls could be beneficial for the evolution
of cooperation [23,48,49].
As we argued, the reason why biased populations support
cooperation is based on the fact that the intervention into
the microscopic dynamics has asymmetric consequences on
strategy invasions. Due to the strongly nonlinear character of
invasion probability, defined by Eq. (1), a slight advantage
of a higher temptation value results in a dramatic advantage
for defectors that cannot be stated about cooperators whose
payoff can hardly exceed a defector’s value. This argument can
be tested easily because if we apply a less nonlinear invasion
probability function then the consequence of strategy-neutral
intervention should be less biased, which would result in a
mitigated cooperator supporting effect. Interestingly, a less
nonlinear probability function can be reached even in the
framework of the used Fermi function if we use higher noise
values. This is illustrated in the inset of Fig. 5 where the
originally steplike, strongly nonlinear function tends to a linear
function as we increase K . The main plot of Fig. 5 confirms
our expectation because by increasing the noise value at a
fixed temptation the maximum value of the cooperation level
decreases gradually. What is more, the cooperator supporting
effect completely disappears above a critical noise value.
Indeed, ρC increases for high α values, but this is just a
consequence of the artificial effect that too high α would result
in a frozen state which may conserve the initial cooperation
level.
Finally, we stress that our observations are not restricted to
a square lattice interaction graph but can also be detected for
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FIG. 6. Fraction of cooperators dependent on α for different
interaction graphs as indicated. The applied temptation values are
T = 1.09, 1.14, 1.06, and 1.02, respectively. For proper comparison
all ρC values are normalized with their maximal values. The system
size of heterogeneous graphs are N = 5000 where cooperation levels
were averaged over 1000 independently generated configurations. For
regular graphs we used K = 0.1 while for heterogeneous graphs,
where payoff values could be highly diverse, we applied K = 0.025
to avoid the noise effect we discussed in the previous plot.
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other networks. Figure 6 illustrates that a positive impact at an
intermediate α can be seen for other types of lattices, random
graphs, and even for a highly heterogeneous scale-free net-
work. The only compelling criterion for the population is to be
structured where network reciprocity can work. Otherwise, in a
well-mixed population, where interactions are just temporary,
we cannot observe the stable coexistence of cooperator and
defector strategies, hence the pattern formations discussed in
Fig. 3 are invalid.
The other crucial criterion is the nonlinear payoff depen-
dence of evolutionary success that is captured by the frequently
used Fermi-type invasion probability, but other types of rules
with similar features can also be cited here [50,51]. Indeed,
the nonlinear character of evolutionary dynamics is a broadly
assumed and experimentally justified feature for a broad range
of systems including biological, ecological, and economical
examples [52–58].
IV. DISCUSSION
The evolution of cooperation is an intensively studied prob-
lem that has attracted hundreds of research papers proposing
many sophisticated strategies and external conditions that
could be helpful to overcome the original conflicts of individual
and collective benefits [59–64]. In the present work we have
studied one of the simplest extensions of the basic prisoner’s
dilemma game and explored its possible consequences on the
cooperation level.
It turns out that when the self-deception level of players is
biased the general cooperation is elevated. Interestingly, to be
overconfident, that is, to think more about their own achieve-
ment than it is worth in reality, is not just vital individually,
but could also be useful collectively. Similarly, the presence of
underconfident players can demolish the plausible advantage
of defection. In both cases we can detect a dynamical effect
that is responsible for this improvement.
The underconfident attitude involves stimulated imitation of
neighbors which results in general coordination of players. The
emergence of locally homogeneous spots, however, directly
supports cooperation strategy because it reveals the advantage
of mutual cooperation. This mechanism can be identified in
those systems where the inequality or heterogeneity of players
were reported as a cooperator promoting circumstance. This
heterogeneity may be originated from topological factors, like
the difference between hub and periphery players, but could
also be derived from individual differences. The latter could be
strategy teaching or learning capacity [65], but also conformity
[66,67] or the willingness to invest heterogeneously to different
neighbors [68,69].
Interestingly, overconfident players behave oppositely, they
are reluctant to adopt neighboring strategies, still, the final out-
come is very similar to those we observed for an underconfident
society. In the latter case the aggressive propagation of success-
ful defectors suffers more from the suppressed microscopic
dynamics. In this way overconfidence attitude enhances the
stability of evolving patterns hence a successful lonely defector
cannot break the phalanx of cooperators even at a reasonably
high temptation value. Put differently, the emergence of an
overconfident attitude can enhance the network reciprocity that
is already present in structured populations. We stress that the
observed behavior is not only the spreading and final triumph
of overconfident players over others with different attitude as
reported in Ref. [3], but the final outcome provides a higher
well being of the whole community via a higher cooperation
level.
It is a common feature of both biased systems that a strategy-
neutral intervention into the dynamics results in a highly biased
impact on the evolution of strategies. This seemingly paradox
behavior was also reported in systems where the cooperation
level was sensitive to the applied dynamics [70,71]. When
the dynamic is suppressed, it retards the successful defector
invasion more, while less successful cooperators benefit more
from the stimulated imitations in the other case. In our present
models these biased consequences are in close relation with the
nonlinear character of imitation dynamics that is a frequently
observed phenomenon, which is broadly used in microscopic
models.
We hope that the present work gives insight into why
overconfidence is a frequently emerging attitude that has a
subtle impact on the success of the whole community.
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